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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL: ARE EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS LEGALLY BINDING?
International agreements are a means of pacifying differences
and developing common goals between nations. Of all the existing
types of international agreements, military security agreements are
the most critical. Dollars, lives and the national security of each
signing party are the crucial factors negotiated. On September 1,
1975, Israel and the United States signed the Memorandum of
Agreement Between the United States of America and Israel, other-
wise known as Agreement E.' The Agreement assured Israel of
military and economic support from the United States in certain
crises.
2
Two interrelated problems concerning the validity and effect
of Agreement E have given rise to much debate. First, Agreement
E did not receive the advice and consent of the Senate and there-
fore is an executive agreement. Executive agreements have been a
matter of controversy since the enactment of the Constitution,3 and
present themselves today as a struggle between the legislative and
executive branches. The legislative branch insists that agreements
such as Agreement E must be formulated as a treaty, receiving the
advice and consent of the Senate. Conversely, the executive branch
contends that in certain exigencies the President may bypass Senate
approval, and that executive agreements have been recognized as
valid by the Framers of the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court and custom and usage.4 One of the most important
1. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United
States of September 1, 1975 , 30 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) at 54, U.N. Doc. S/
11818/Add. 1 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1450 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Agreement El.
2. Id.
3. Feinrider, America's Oil Pledges to Israel: Illegal but Binding Executive Agreements,
13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 525, 525 (1981).
4. See generally M. Glennon, Memorandum of Law and Appendices (Sept. 24, 1975),
reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 32,705 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sept. 24 Glennon Memo]; M.
Glennon, Memorandum of Law-Response to Memorandum of Department of State Legal
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constitutional issues affecting international diplomacy is whether
the President has the constitutional authority to commit the United
States to crucial international agreements, such as Agreement E.'
The legislative branch is now seeking to regain certain rights to
control agreements of "exceptional national importance" while the
executive branch is attempting to retain these powers.
The second major problem with Agreement E is its subject
matter. The United States has granted both military and economic
assurances to Israel. However, whether these assurances are to be
given the heightened level of consideration accorded to treaties
made with the advice and consent of the Senate, or whether the
assurances are given lesser importance by calling them mere execu-
tive policy declarations and promises, will have a great impact on
future United States-Middle East diplomacy. The moral and diplo-
matic implications are tantamount to Agreement E's validity. In-
trinsic to the agreement's validity is the good faith of the United
States.6
This Comment will review the historical development and ex-
amine the subject matter content of Agreement E, primarily focus-
ing on paragraphs one, seven, ten, eleven and fourteen. The
following sections will analyze the validity of Agreement E under
United States domestic law. Specifically addressed are the issues of
whether Agreement E should have been formulated as a treaty, or
whether as an executive agreement, Agreement E will be upheld as
legally binding. The parameters defining the proper usage of trea-
ties and executive agreements are nebulous. This Comment, how-
ever, concludes that Agreement E is legally binding. Finally, given
Agreement E's validity or invalidity under domestic law, this Com-
ment will examine Agreement E's effect under international law
and specify the degree of assurance Israel can expect from the
United States.
Adviser Regarding Secret Middle East Agreements (Oct. 22, 1975), reprinted in 121 CONG.
REC. 36,722 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Oct. 22 Glennon Reply]; A. Rovine, Department of
State Assistant Legal Adviser's Reply to Second Memorandum of Senate Office of Legisla-
tive Counsel Concerning Certain Middle East Agreements (Feb. 4, 1976), reprinted in 15
I.L.M. 190 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Feb. 4 Rovine Reply].
5. Mathews, The Constitutional Power ofthe President to Conclude InternationalAgree-
ments, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 345 (1955).
6. Feinrider, supra note 3, at 531 n.34.
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In 1975, the road to peace in the Middle East centered upon
the Sinai Accords. 7 This historic peace effort materialized as a re-
sult of the combined impetus of the United States, Israel and
Egypt.8 One of the most significant aspects of the Sinai Accords
was Israel's consent to withdraw from the Sinai.9 The realization of
this major relinquishment, as with attaining peace altogether, was
predicated on certain United States commitments.' 0 One such
commitment which fostered Israeli cooperation was Agreement
E.1 II
The birth of peace in the Middle East was to occur when the
United States supplied and staffed an early-warning system in the
Sinai and extended collateral assurances formulated under Agree-
ment E. l" The early-warning system issue was before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations.' 3 In an effort to encourage congressional ap-
proval, the legal authority for each of Agreement E's provisions
was proferred by the Department of State and its Office of Legal
Advisor.' 4  After Congress voted on the early-warning system,'
5
Agreement E was consumed in controversy because of questionable
7. The Sinai Accords include: the Agreement on the Sinai and Suez Canal, Sept. 4,
1975, Egypt-Israel, 30 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) at 54, U.N. Doc. S/11818/Add. i
(1975), reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 1450 (1975); Memorandum of Agreement Between the Govern-
ments of Israel and the United States of America of Sept. 1, 1975; Memorandum of Agree-
ment Between the Governments of Israel and the United States (The Geneva Peace
Conference)(undated).
8. Id. See Sinai Accords cited supra note 7.
9. The Agreement on the Sinai and Suez canal, Sept. 4, 1975, Egypt-Israel, 30 U.N.
SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) at 54, U.N. Doc. S/I 1818/Add. 1 (1975), reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 1450 (1975).
10. See generally Agreement E, supra note 1.
1I. Feinrider, supra note 3, at 528 n.17.
12. See generally Agreement E, supra note I.
13. Feinrider, supra note 3, at 529.
14. See Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the State Department, to Thomas
E. Morgan, Chairman, House International Relations Committee (Sept. 29, 1975), reprinted
in 121 CONG. REC. 32,724 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sept. 29 Leigh Letter]; Letter from
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the State Department, to Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman,
House International Relations Committee (Sept. 18, 1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REC.
32,724 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sept. 18 Leigh Letter]; M. Leigh, Department of State
Legal Adviser's Reply to Senate Office of Legislative Counsel Memorandum on Certain
Middle East Agreements (Oct. 8, 1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 36,718 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Oct. 8 Leigh Reply].
15. See supra notes 4 and 14.
3
De Pol: United States Military and Economic Assurances to Israel: Are Exe
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
assurances and their binding status. The Senate Legislative Coun-
sel acted as the Executive's opposition in the debate over Agree-
ment E.16 The legal memoranda were matched against one
another, evidencing valid criteria both for and against Agreement
E's proper legal authority.17
Since the creation of the Constitution, much debate has oc-
curred over the constitutionality of executive agreements. Two
principal main issues in the legal memoranda epitomize this his-
toric debate. First, is whether Agreement E is constitutionally per-
missible under the powers granted to the President by the
Constitution. 8 Second, given that executive agreements are consti-
tutionally valid, is whether Agreement E, due to its subject matter,
should have been formulated as a treaty and therefore passed
before the Senate.' 9 Evidence used for argument focused upon ex-
ecutive agreements per se and the subject matter of Agreement E.2°
B. The Military and Economic Assurances of Agreement E
Agreement E was signed on September 1, 1975, by Yigal Al-
Ion, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for
Israel and Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State for the United
States. 2' In paragraph one, the United States guarantees that "it
will make every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its
resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, in an
on-going and long term basis to Israel's military equipment and
other defense requirements, to its energy requirements, and to its
economic needs."' 22 The term "fully responsive" has drawn much
debate concerning its lack of clarity.23 The executive and legisla-
tive branches primarily based Agreement E's legal status on the
"importance" of the assurances. The level of United States com-
mitment to Israel, and the manner in which it would be "fully re-
16. The Senate Legislative Counsel claimed that Agreement E was beyond the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority, while the Department of State Legal Adviser asserted that the
agreement is a legally binding executive agreement. See supra notes 4 and 14.
17. Both government branches relied on opinions by the Supreme Court, the intentions
of the Founding Fathers, the Constitution, Senate resolutions, and custom and usage. See
supra notes 4 and 14.
18. See supra notes 4 and 14.
19. See supra notes 4 and 14.
20. See supra notes 4 and 14.
21. Agreement E, supra note 1.
22. Id. para. 1.
23. Feb. 4 Rovine Reply, supra note 4, at 196.
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sponsive," determined Agreement E's "importance. "24 Both
government branches concluded their memoranda with disparate
interpretations of Agreement E's legal status.25
Paragraph ten has created much controversy over the extent of
the United States commitment to Israel and the manner in which
the United States will be responsive. Paragraph ten states that:
In view of the long-standing United States commitment to the
survival and security of Israel, the United States Government
will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or
sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective the
United States Government will in the event of such threat con-
sult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what
support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to
Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.26
Paragraph ten has been given disparate forms of construction. The
legislative branch interprets it to mean that the United States will
introduce its armed forces into hostilities for certain purposes.27
The executive branch construes paragraph ten as mere policy decla-
rations and presidential promises to make certain requests of Con-
gress for Israel's defense. 28  Based on the interpretation of
paragraph ten, the manner in which the United States responded to
an Israeli crisis would be indicative of Agreement E's importance
and, arguably, its validity.
The ambiguous language contained in paragraphs seven,
eleven and fourteen is vulnerable to the broad interpretation simi-
larly given to paragraph ten.29 Paragraph seven assures "possible
24. See supra notes 4 and 14.
25. The Department of State concluded that "importance" is not determinative of the
formality to be given an international agreement. Regardless of the United States level of
,ommitment, the President acted within his constitutional authority and, therefore, Agree-
ment E is legally valid. The Senate Legislative Counsel concluded that Agreement E is inva-
lid because the "importance" of the assurances warranted the formality of a treaty. Without
Senate advice and consent, the Counsel argued, Agreement E is invalid. See generally supra
notes 4 and 14.
26. Agreement E, supra note 1, para. 10.
27. The United States would introduce its forces for reasons of:
a. taking remedial action in the case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provi-
sions of the agreement (1 70);
b. defending Israel against threats by a world power (1 10);
c. maintaining Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through the Straits of
Bab-el-Mandab and the Strait of Gibraltar ( 14);
d. carrying out a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation (I
11).
Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 198.
28. Feb. 4. Rovine Reply, supra note 4, at 198.
29. See generally Agreement E, supra note I.
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remedial action by the United States" if Egypt violates Agreement
E.1° Paragraph eleven provides for the establishment of a contin-
gency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emer-
gency situation.3' Paragraph fourteen assures Israel that the
United States will "support Israel's right to free and unimpeded
passage through the Straits of Bab-el-Mandab and the Strait of
Gibraltar.
32
The subject matter of paragraphs seven, eleven, and fourteen,
as well as paragraphs one and ten, has been the catalyst for the
debate between the executive and legislative branches. 33 The legal
status of Agreement E is not clearly dispositive because of the neb-
ulous parameters defining what subject matter should be accorded
to either the formality of a treaty or executive agreement. 34 The
legislative branch argues that Agreement E should have been for-
mulated as a treaty and therefore received Senate consent.35 The
executive branch contends that the promulgation of Agreement E is
within the President's authority and is therefore a valid executive
agreement.36
II. VALIDITY OF AGREEMENT E UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
A. The Legislative Interpretation of Agreement E as a Treaty
Under the United States Constitution, the President may make
treaties provided that such an agreement is made with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and two-thirds of the Senators present
concur. 37 Under the supremacy clause, all treaties made pursuant
30. "In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement, the
United States Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the
violation and possible remedial action by the United States Government." Agreement E,
supra note 1, para. 7.
3 1. "The United States Government and the Government of Israel will, at the earliest
possible time, and if possible, within two months after the signature of this document, con-
clude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situa-
tion." Agreement E, supra note 1, para. 11.
32. In accordance with the principles of freedom of navigation on the high seas and
free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international wa-
ters, the United States Government regards the straits of Bab-el-Mandab and the
Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free
and unimpeded passage through such straits.
Agreement E, supra note 1, para. 14. The remainder of paragraph 14 assures diplomatic
support to Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits.
33. See generally supra notes 4 and 14.
34. See generally Mathews, supra note 5.
35. Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,705.
36. Oct. 8 Leigh Reply, supra note 14, at 36,721.
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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to the Constitution shall be the "supreme Law of the Land."' 38 The
United States constitutional framework for a treaty is narrower in
comparison to the international codification of a treaty.39 The Vi-
enna Convention of the Law of Treaties defined treaty as an "inter-
national agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single in-
strument or in two or more related instructions and whatever its
particular designation."4
The application of United States treaties in foreign affairs is
practically limitless.4 I A treaty exists as a valid legal device so long
as the government or its department's actions are not unconstitu-
tional and the "treaty does not authorize what the Constitution for-
bids."'42 The rules of law governing treaties fill a spectrum ranging
from concise and dispositive to amorphous and controversial.
Treaties can deal with any subject appropriate to international
negotiation. To be binding, treaties must be ratified by the Sen-
ate and furthermore, treaties confer legislative powers on Con-
gress. Congress can repeal a treaty for domestic purposes only;
the international obligation remains binding. A treaty, however,
can repeal an act of Congress. The duration of a treaty lasts as
long as its terms provide. Treaties must be published and there-
fore cannot be secret.43
1. The Clark Resolution. Congress, in an attempt to regain its
treaty-making powers" which were diluted by the increased use of
38. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
39. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. II, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
40. Id.
41. Charles Evan Hughes, a former Secretary of State and Chief Justice, commenting
on permissible subjects for treaties, stated that "any limitation to be implied (on the Treaty
Power) might be found in the nature of the treaty making power." The power is to deal with
foreign nations with regard to matters of international concern. 23 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. 194-96 (1929). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 117(1) com-
ment b (1965). "Usually, matters of international concern have both international and do-
mestic effects, and the existence of the latter does not remove a matter from international
concern." Id.
42. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
43. Bouchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements--A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 628-29
(1945).
44. For example, Senator Dick Clark in making the committee's opening statement at
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Treaty Powers Resolution on July
21, 1976, stated, "It is fair to say that this requirement of Senate advice and consent has been
circumvented in recent years by various administrations-Democratic and Republican-by
calling agreements 'executive agreements' when the subject matter of these agreements was
sufficiently important to require their submission as treaties." Kuchenbecker, Agency--Level
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executive agreements, 45 introduced the Clark Resolution.46  The
Clark Resolution codified certain subject matter which must be
made as treaties. 47 Any international agreement not authorized by
statute, treaty, or under an emergency situation, which involves a
significant political, military, or economic commitment to a foreign
country, constitutes a treaty.48 In such event, therefore, the agree-
ment should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent.49
Although introduced subsequent to Agreement E, the Clark
Resolution is persuasive for the argument that Agreement E should
have been made as a treaty. The issue again would be whether the
assurances are mere executive policy declarations or commitments
to introduce United States forces with congressional approval.
Paragraphs one, seven, ten, eleven, and fourteen could arguably be
construed as "significant political, military, or economic commit-
ments to a foreign country." 5 The level of involvement or commit-
ment intended by the President, when making the agreement,
would determine the formality of the agreement under the Clark
Resolution. The Clark Resolution, however, was not the only legis-
lative attempt at regaining treaty-making powers, which in essence
might invalidate Agreement E.
2. The National Commitments Resolution. The Senate Legisla-
tive Counsel concluded that Agreement E is in violation of the Na-
tional Commitments Resolution.5 "National Commitment" is
Executive Agreements. A New Era in U.S. Treaty Practice, 18 COLUM. J. OF TRANS. L. 1, 3
(1979).
45. From 1972 to 1977 the ratio of executive agreements to treaties was twenty-five to
one; entering into force were 1,590 executive agreements as compared to only sixty-three
treaties. Id. at 2.
46. Treaty Powers Resolution: Hearings on S. Res. 486 Before the Comm. on Foreign




50. Agreement E's provisions were interpreted as significant by the Senate Legislative
Counsel. Viewing Agreement E in terms of the "broadest reasonable construction" to which
it could be subjected, either by Israel or by a United States President, the agreement provides
that the United States will introduce its armed forces into hostilities. The reasons for sending
armed forces are delineated supra note 27. The Counsel applied the "broadest reasonable
construction" because of Agreement E's ambiguous language. Ambiguities in the law,
"makes possible broad but still reasonable interpretations, which could cause unpredictable
results." Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 196. The "broadest reasonable construc-
tion" is not consonant with the intentions of the parties or the meaning of the agreements.
51. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 17,245 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
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defined as "the use of the armed forces of the United States on
foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, govern-
ment, or people by the use of the armed forces or financial re-
sources of the United States, either immediately or upon the
happening of certain events."52 The Counsel determined that
Agreement E related to a subject matter of "exceptional national
importance," and therefore was a matter within the National Com-
mitments Resolution.53 The resolution further stated that "no sig-
nificant foreign commitment ought to be undertaken without
affirmative action by both the legislative and executive branches."54
The conclusion of the Counsel, therefore, is that Agreement E
"cannot result in a commitment by the United States."55 The "ex-
ceptional national importance" view also provided a basis for argu-
ing that Agreement E should have been regarded constitutionally
as a treaty.
5 6
3. The United States Constitution: Article I, section 2. The
Senate Legislative Counsel alleged that article II, section 2 is evi-
dence that "some international agreements must be regarded, con-
stitutionally as treaties."57 The treaty clause provides that the
President "shall have power by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate pres-
ent concur. . . ." If the President has unlimited discretion to con-
Commitments Resolution]. The resolution is not law but provides the "sense of the Senate."
Treaty Powers Resolution." Hearings on S Res. 486 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1976). The seventy United States Senators who voted in favor of
the resolution-as well as the Committee on Foreign Relations from which it was unani-
mously reported-hold an unconstitutionally narrow view of presidential power; the Consti-
tution requires affirmative action by the legislative branch. Oct. 22 Glennon Reply, supra
note 4, at 36,723.
52. Commitments Resolution, supra note 51, at 17,245.
53. The Senate Legislative Counsel, in determining "exceptional national importance,"
again relied on the "broadest reasonable interpretation."
Agreement E seems clearly to be a 'promise to assist' Israel at least 'by the use of
the. . . financial resources of the United States,' both 'immediately' and also 'upon
the happening of certain events.' Thus the obligations undertaken in Agreement E
clearly constitute a 'national commitment' within the meaning of clause 1 of the
National Commitments Resolution.
Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,708.
54. Commitments Resolution, supra note 51, at 17,245.
55. Id. But see Feb. 4 Rovine Reply, supra note 4, at 197. First, the resolution does not
eliminate the problem of choosing between a treaty and an executive agreement should the
latter be authorized by statute; second, even if the resolution were legally binding, it does not
require a treaty in any given case; and third, the resolution is not legally binding.
56. Oct. 22 Glennon Reply, supra note 4, at 36,722.
57. Id.
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clude any agreement as an executive agreement, the advice and
consent of the Senate would be rendered meaningless.5" The use of
treaties, therefore, would be "required" at the discretion of the
President.59 The Counsel asserts, on the other hand, that if some
international agreements must be regarded as treaties, agreements
of "exceptional national importance" must be so regarded.6 °
This view of the Senate Legislative Counsel has been sup-
ported by many leading scholars and statesmen.6' The most cogent
reasoning, given by Senator Sam Ervin, states that:
[It] is inconceivable that the Founding Fathers would have
taken the trouble to spell out in Article II, section 2, exactly how
a treaty should be made and at the same time to have an inher-
ent power in a President, one man, to make an agreement with a
foreign nation without any formality and not consulting with
anybody but himself.
6 2
Arguably, Agreement E portends to be an agreement of exceptional
national importance63 and therefore should have received the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. Without Senate approval, Agree-
ment E is in violation of the Constitution.'
The Senate Legislative Counsel primarily depends on the "sig-
nificance" 65 or "exceptional national importance" 66 criteria in es-
pousing that Agreement E is constitutionally deficient. The
rationale relied on in determining that Agreement E is significant
or important is the "broadest reasonable interpretation" that either
Israel or the United States could give to the Agreement's provi-




61. The Framers intended the closest possible collaboration between the President and
the Senate when making international agreements. John Jay declared that international
agreements, especially those relating to war, peace and commerce, should not be delegated
outside the treaty-making process. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 195 (J. Jay) (M. Beloff ed.
1952). Alexander Hamilton, "no advocate of legislative power, believed that the legislative
branch had to be included in the powers of making international commitments." THE FED-
ERALIST No. 75, at 223 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed. 1948). James Madison regarded the
making of international pacts as more of a legislative function than an executive function.
Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,706.
62. Oct. 22 Glennon Reply, supra note 4, at 36,724.
63. See supra notes 48, 50, 53 and accompanying text.
64. Oct. 22 Glennon Reply, supra note 4, at 36,722.
65. See generally replies and memo cited supra note 4.
66. See Commitments Resolution, supra note 51; Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4,
at 32,708.
67. See supra notes 49, 53 and accompanying text.
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United States will introduce its armed forces to protect Israel, is an
agreement which warrants Senate advice and consent; without Sen-
ate approval, Agreement E is invalid and therefore not legally
binding. 68 Historically, international agreements possessing "im-
portant" subject matter similar to Agreement E received the advice
and consent of the Senate.
4. Custom and Usage. The foundation of the Senate's attack
on Agreement E's validity related to its subject matter.69 The issue
was what subject matter was to be legally appropriated to either
treaties or executive agreements. One means of determining what
subject matter is constitutional is to review what customarily has
been the language and substance of treaties.7" The custom and us-
age previously accorded to agreements similar to Agreement E,
more specifically to paragraph ten, has primarily been treaties.7'
Five treaties support the Counsel's assertion that Agreement E
should have been formulated as a treaty. Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty states that any armed attack against one of the rati-
fying parties shall be considered an attack against all the parties.72
It was agreed that such an attack could necessitate the use of armed
forces. 73 The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States
and the Republic of the Phillipines74 directs the two parties to con-
sult when either is threatened, in case the treaty need be imple-
68. Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,707.
69. See supra notes 49, 53 and accompanying text.
70. The Supreme Court has held that usage and practice are valid guides to the mean-
ing of the Constitution and statutes. Inland Waters Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524
(1940).
71. Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,709.
72. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 14, 1949, art. V, 66 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243, provides as follows:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right
of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.
73. Id.
74. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic
of the Phillipines, Aug. 30, 1951, art. III, 3 U.S.T. 3947, T.I.A.S. No. 2529, 177 U.N.T.S. 133,
provides as follows:
[tihe Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together
from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the
opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security
of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.
11
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mented.75 Other treaties bearing the same assurances are: The
Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States of America,76 The Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States of America and the Republic of Korea,77 and the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.78 Each administration
responsible for these mutual defense and collective security treaties,
which are similar to Agreement E, sought the advice and consent of
the Senate.
Recent agreements which promised the same types of assur-
ances, but were formulated as executive agreements between Presi-
dent Nixon, of the United States, and President Thieu, of South
Vietnam, lacked validity.79 The agreements promised that "the
United States would respond with full force in the event of certain
violations of the Paris Agreement by North Vietnam,"8 and
"[President Thieu] has the absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to
abide by the terms of the [Paris Agreement], it is the intention of
the United States to take swift and severe retaliatory action."'"
When the United States failed to comply with these executive
agreements, the question was raised whether the United States vio-
lated international law.82 The Senate Legislative Counsel answered
in the negative for the reasons that: (1) the agreement was beyond
75. Id.
76. Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America,
Sept. 1, 1951, art. 111, 3 U.S.T. 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, provides that "the
Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific."
77. Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, United States-Republic of Korea, art. III, 5
U.S.T. 2368, T.I.A.S. No. 3097, provides as follows:
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the
political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external
armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will
maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suita-
ble measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further
its purposes.
78. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, art. IV, para. 1, 6 U.S.T.
81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28, provides as follows:
Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area
against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by
unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and
safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in ac-
cordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.
79. Letter from former President Nixon to former President Thieu (Nov. 14, 1912 and
Jan. 5, 1973) reprinted in N.Y. Times, May 1, 1975, at 16. The former President continues to
withhold these letters from public review.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,712.
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the constitutional authority of the President, acting alone, to make;
(2) South Vietnam should reasonably have known of such defect;
83
(3) the agreements were invalid executive agreements, without
force and effect under international law. 4 The Counsel further
concluded that such invalid agreements can lead to political and
diplomatic misunderstandings, recriminations, and generally un-
desirable international and domestic repercussions.8 5 One cannot
absolutely deny, therefore, that Agreement E could not suffer the
same consequences as that of the Nixon-Thieu agreements, since it
too is an executive agreement guaranteeing similar assurances.
The bases of the Senate Legislative Counsel's assertions lend
much credence to its conclusion that Agreement E is invalid. To
ignore the sense of the Senate, the opinions of scholars and states-
man, custom and usage, and the Constitution would constitute an
impropriety within the legal analysis of Agreement E's validity.
The Senate Legislative Counsel's decision that there exists no
United States commitment under Agreement E cannot be ade-
quately tested, however, until weighed against the competing fac-
tors of executive agreements.
B. Upholding Agreement E as a Legally Binding
Executive Agreement
Executive agreements fall outside the treaty process. Execu-
tive agreements either implement treaties or certain acts of Con-
gress, or are made solely on the basis of the President's
constitutional powers.86 Agreements made without the consent of
the Senate,87 the approval of Congress, or the support of a treaty
are called "sole-executive agreements."88 Congressional-executive
agreements, since formulated with Congressional approval and the
opportunity for debate, are less likely to stir congressional anger
than "sole-executive agreements."
When the President makes an agreement based on his consti-
tutional powers, they are seldom articulated.89 The President's
83. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
84. Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,712.
85. Id.
86. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 177 (1972).
87. Id.
88. Leary, International Executive Agreements." A Guide to the Legal Issues and Research
Sources, 72 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 3 (1979).
89. Id. at 6.
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power to make "sole-executive agreements" rests upon article II of
the United States Constitution which states:
[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America ...[tihe President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy . . . [h]e shall have the power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make treaties
; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls . . . [h]e shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed...90
The majority of "sole-executive agreements" have been made pur-
suant to the President's authority as Commander in Chief.9' Most
controversies arise from the subject matter comprising the
agreements.
The Department of State, in its Foreign Affairs Manual, pro-
vides procedural guidance when considering the formality to be
given an international agreement.92
In determining whether any international agreement should be
brought into force as a treaty or as an international agreement
other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid
any invasion or compromise of the constitutional powers of the
Senate, the Congress as a whole, or the President.93
Presidential agreements will sometimes unavoidably overlap into
domestic areas of congressional authority.94 In such an instance the
"domestic effects" doctrine may apply.
9 5
The "domestic effects" doctrine provides that Congress may
abrogate the domestic effect of any international agreement when
that agreement concerns a subject which Congress could have legis-
lated domestically. 96 Congress may indirectly overrule an interna-
tional agreement by refusing to implement such legislation, or
supersede an agreement with new legislation.97 Agreement E, in
paragraph one, provides that "the [United States] will make every
effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and
Congressional authorization and appropriation."98 Congress will,
90. U.S. CONST. art. II.
91. Leary, supra note 88, at 5.
92. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Vol. II, ch. 70 (1974).
93. Id.




98. Agreement E, supra note 1, para. 1.
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therefore, in accordance with Agreement E's provisions, have the
ability to make the limitations it considers necessary.
Executive agreements cannot confer on the government pow-
ers which are "free from the restraints of the Constitution."99 Rules
pertaining to "sole-executive agreements" are:
The agreement is strictly limited to the powers invested in the
President by the Constitution; the agreement cannot confer on
Congress powers of legislation it did not have before; the agree-
ment need not be ratified by the United States; the agreement
cannot repeal an act of Congress and can be nullified by treaty;
and an executive agreement invites secrecy since the President
can make it without notifying anybody."°
Traditionally, treaties involved matters of significance, while execu-
tive agreements carried out administrative affairs.'l' In a 1969 Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee report,"°2 this concept, notably
known as the "importance test," was said to have broken down.
"In some instances we have come close to reversing the traditional
distinction between the treaty as the instrument of a major commit-
ment and the executive agreement as the instrument of a minor
one." 1
0 3
Executive agreements made pursuant to statute, treaty or the
Constitution have been accepted, historically, as constitutionally
appropriate."° The authority for Agreement E derives from both
the statute and the President's constitutional powers. 0 5 Paragraphs
one through four cover undertakings and statements focusing on
economic assistance, defense equipment supply and the sale of
oil. 10 6 Paragraphs seven, ten, eleven and fourteen 10 7 are alleged to
99. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
100. Bouchard, supra note 43, at 628-29.
101. In 1939 an Assistant Secretary of State wrote:
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy
and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually
take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of
detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those in-
volving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of
executive agreements.
Sayer, The Constitutionality of the TradeAgreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 751, 755 (1939).
102. REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S.
REP. No. 129, 91st Cong., ist Sess. 26 (1969).
103. Id. at 28.
104. Feb. 4 Rovine Reply, supra note 4, at 195.
105. Id. at 197.
106. Agreement E, supra note I, para. 1-4.
107. Economic assistance, if funds are appropriated, would be implemented by the au-
thority contained in section 531 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Defense equipment
supply would be sold by the provisions of chapter 2 of the Foreign Military Sales Act. The
15
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rest upon the President's constitutional powers to conduct foreign
relations.'0 8 Agreement E, if severable, would therefore be a con-
gressional-executive agreement as to paragraphs one through four
and a "sole-executive agreement" as to paragraphs seven, ten,
eleven and fourteen.
1. Matters of Expediency. A valid contention for the reversal
of roles between treaties and executive agreements is foreign-affair
dynamics."° Quite often important factors require the prompt con-
clusion of an agreement. 110 The President may thus choose the for-
mality of an executive agreement for matters of expediency."'I "In
some instances, the executive departments would face disaster if
they relied on the less expedient treaty making process in dealing
with foreign governments.""' 2 In addition, many foreign govern-
ments frequently prefer the certainty of knowing that an agreement
with the United States will enter into effect as negotiated; the sign-
ing of an executive agreement assures this preference.' 13
The degree of crisis and available decision-making time have
customarily dictated the President's "substantive powers" and
therefore his scope of authority to make international agree-
ments. 114 When the crisis is severe and time is short, the President
attains powers which in less critical times would be a usurpation of
power.' '5 Presented with an opportunity to establish peace in the
Middle East through the Sinai Accords, the formality of having
made Agreement E an executive agreement seems most appropri-
ate. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the viability of the "stop shoot-
ing-start talking" initiative were the central issues after the Six Day
sale of oil is authorized by section 12(b) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and sec-
tion 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Feb. 4 Rovine Reply, supra note 4, at 197.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 192.
110. Cease-fire and other military agreements, for example, which must be timed
precisely to the hour and minute, are concluded as executive agreements rather
than treaties. An example is the 1973 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
the Peace in Vietnam (T.I.A.S. 7542; 24 U.S.T. 1). War-time agreements dealing
with the actual military conduct of the war may be of crucial significance for the




112. Wendel, Constitutional Authority for Executive Agreements Pertaining to the Armed
Forces, 20 A.F. L. REV. 71, 81 (1978).
113. Kuchenbecker, supra note 44, at 4.
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War of June 1967.116 The United States also viewed the United
States-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East as having the "potential, if
not actual danger of possibly rising to confrontation or conflict."'"1
7
The United States, therefore, initiated extensive diplomatic maneu-
vering and intensive debate."I8 To lose a hard sought-after oppor-
tunity for peace to the deliberations of the Senate could have
caused deleterious effects.
It is a primary requisite in conducting foreign affairs that the
United States have the ability to act expeditiously."l 9 The determi-
native factors which the President considers before selecting the
formality of an international agreement, in addition to expediency,
are trustworthiness, accuracy and secrecy.' 20 The executive agree-
ment is highly suitable in fulfilling such considerations and there-
fore, historically, has been applied in many diverse areas of foreign
affairs.
2. Custom and Usage. The Supreme Court has held that usage
and practice are valid guides for determining the meaning of the
Constitution and statutes.' 21 Between 1972 and 1977, the ratio of
executive agreements to treaties was twenty-five to one. 122 Reasons
for such inequality have been attributed to the increase in nations,
the general increase of United States participation in world politics,
and the existence of many more subjects for agreements. This has
created the need for the expeditious executive agreement. 23
The consensus of the Founding Fathers was that all interna-
tional agreements should pass before the Senate.124 A few years
after the enactment of the Constitution, however, some of the fram-
ers of the document were ignoring the treaty process. 121 In 1799,
President John Adams authorized an agreement with the Nether-
116. Reich, United States Policy in the Middle East, 60 CURRENT HIST. 1, 6 (1971).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Congress is poorly equipped to [act swiftly]. . . . In the domestic field, we can
afford friction among the three branches of government, which, by its effect of slow-
ing decision and inducing compromise, has the consequence of promoting the re-
sponsiveness of policy makers to the country as a whole. But in matters involving
the external relations of the nation, this friction may become a great source of seri-
ous danger.
Mathews, supra note 5, at 375-76.
120. Kuchenbecker, supra note 44, at 4.
121. Inland Waters Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 525 (1940).
122. See supra note 45.
123. But see supra text accompanying notes 69-85.
124. Oct. 22 Glennon Reply, nupra note 4, at 36,722-23.
125. Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,706.
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lands for settling private American claims. 126 The agreement was
neither submitted to the Senate nor ratified.' 27 In 1817, the Rush-
Bagot Agreement was concluded to disarm the Great Lakes. 2 '
This agreement had been initiated by President James Madison
and concluded by President James Monroe. 2 9 Other wide-ranging
executive agreements were created without "reflecting any principle
of limitation."13
0
Root-Takahira and Lansing-Ishii defined American policy in the
Far East. A Gentleman's Agreement with Japan (1907) limited
Japanese immigration into the United States. Theodore
Roosevelt put the bankrupt customs houses of Santo Domingo
under American control to prevent European creditors from
seizing them. McKinley agreed to contribute troops to protect
Western legations during the Boxer Rebellion and later accepted
the Boxer Indemnity Protocol for the United States. Franklin
Roosevelt exchanged over-age destroyers from British bases.
Potsdam and Yalta shaped the political face of the world after
the Second World War.' 1
3
The weight of evidence, in numbers alone, indicates that the
treaty-making procedure is neither the exclusive nor sole recourse
of the Federal Government for making "important" international
agreements. The Department of State Legal Adviser refuted the
Senate Legislative Counsel's conclusion that Agreement E consti-
tuted an agreement of "exceptional national importance" and
therefore should receive the formality of a treaty, unlike other exec-
utive agreements.' 32 The legal adviser claimed that the Counsel's
"broadest reasonable construction" did not regard: (1) financial
costs; (2) aggressive acts by Israel; (3) acts violating the United Na-
tions Charter; and, (4) change in the relationship between the
United States and Israel. 3 3 Arguably, previous executive agree-
ments made by the United States have been both important and
unimportant. To espouse that the vague provisions of Agreement
E, which are subject to broad interpretation, should unequivocally
have been made as a treaty, disregards the overwhelming historical
application of executive agreements.
126. Feb. 4 Rovine Reply, supra note 4, at 194.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 192.
129. Id. at 193.
130. L. HENKIN, upra note 86, at 179.
131. Id.
132. Feb. 4 Rovine Reply, supra note 4, at 198.
133. Id. at 196.
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John Marshall stated in 1799 that the "President is the sole
organ of a nation in its external relations and its sole representative
with foreign nations."' 34 As noted by a legal adviser to the Depart-
ment of State, however, "the President's choice is not totally unfet-
tered; [he] will rarely disregard customs and practices, 135 [nor]
willingly or lightly flout the general expectations and preferences of
the Congress." '136 To remove the President's power of discretion
and assign it to a legal requirement that a particular type of agree-
ment be made would severely interfere with the administration of
effective foreign policy.137 The Supreme Court of the United States
has never prescribed a legal requirement in formulating executive
agreements. 
38
3. Supreme Court Opinions. The Supreme Court has not held
any executive agreement ultra vires for lack of Senate consent; nor
has it given guidance that might define the President's power to act
alone. 39 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Justice Suther-
land stated that the power to make international agreements does
exist, although not expressed in the Constitution. 40 This power ex-
ists "as inherently inseperable from the conception of national-
ity."'' In United States v. Pink, the Supreme Court, quoting from
The Federalist, stated that "all constitutional acts of power, whether
in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal
validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature."' 42
The Department of State asserts that paragraph one is derived
from statutory authority while paragraphs seven, ten, eleven and
fourteen are based upon the President's constitutional powers to
conduct foreign affairs.'43 Following the reasoning of Pink, since
Agreement E is made pursuant to proper legal authority, the Agree-
134. Wendel, supra note 112, at 74.
135. But see supra text accompanying notes 69-85.
136. But see supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. President Nixon abused his presi-
dential powers and formulated invalid international agreements. See also supra text accom-
panying notes 44-56; Oct. 8 Leigh Reply, supra note 14, at 36,719.
137. See supra note 136.
138. L. HENKIN, supra note 86, at 179.
139. Id.
140. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
141. Id.
142. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Pink].
143. The Senate Legislative Counsel claims that the President does have the constitu-
tional powers to conduct foreign relations, but they are limited by "exceptional national
important" matters. Agreement E, therefore, does not follow the reasoning in Pink. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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ment is constitutional, having the same "validity and obligation" as
if it received Senate advice and consent.
"Sole-executive agreements" may be self-executing. 44  Once
made, the agreement cannot be "refused full force and effect in
either municipal or international law simply because it was not sub-
mitted to the Senate as a treaty." 45  A "sole-executive agreement,"
outside the President's constitutional authority and without the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, will be without force and effect
under domestic law.146 An excellent delineation of levels of Presi-
dential authority when making executive agreements is given in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.147 The Supreme Court
held that when the President makes an agreement based on his con-
stitutional authority and concurrently Congress remains neutral,
his authority is at medium.' 4  The Constitution in itself, however,
may limit the President's powers by the guarantees of private rights
vested in the first amendment. 149 Although the first amendment is
directed at congressional acts, the fifth amendment's due process
clause extends this protection to all federal action. 5 °
144. See United States v. Relmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Belmont]
and Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
145. Oct. 8 Leigh Reply, supra note 14, at 36,721.
146. See generally Oct. 22 Glennon Reply, supra note 4.
147. (a) When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sover-
eignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances it usually
means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by
the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation and
the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
(b) When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority he can only rely upon his own independent powers but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quies-
cence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable if not invite, measures of
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than abstract theories of law.
(c) When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power
at once so conclusive and preclusive must bc scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson J., concurring
in the judgment).
148. Id. at 635-36.
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The judiciary has recognized certain aspects of presidential
agreements when reviewing "sole-executive agreements."',' Presi-
dential agreements may modify or terminate prior treaties.15 2 Con-
trary to a state's ability to control foreign policy, an executive
agreement has priority over state law. 153 Presidential agreements
are superior to inconsistent state legislation. 154 Some authors, in
opposition to the general rule, have proposed that "if the subject of
the agreement is a matter within the President's special constitu-
tional competence . . . the separation of powers doctrine might in
some situations appropriately permit the President to disregard a
(federal) statute as an unconstitutional invasion of his own pow-
ers." ' 55 The established rule was laid down by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit. The court held that "in areas of
concurrent jurisdiction the President may not enter into an execu-
tive agreement in violation of regulations prescribed by
Congress." 
1 5 6
The Constitution provides that treaties are to be considered
the "supreme Law of the Land."' 57 In Pink 158 and Belmont159 the
Court held that "sole-executive agreements" are of equal dignity
with treaties under the supremacy clause.' 6 ° Furthermore, under
international and domestic law, "the legal consequences of a treaty,
an independently concluded executive agreement, and a congres-
sional-executive agreement are substantially the same."'
16'
The constitutionality of executive agreements has been sub-
stantiated by the Supreme Court, the actions of the Founding Fa-
thers and the fundamental requisites enabling the President to
conduct foreign affairs. The most cogent claim is that the Presi-
dent, solely, has the power to determine which type of agreement
shall be utilized. 162 The Executive, more than any other branch of
government, is able to direct foreign affairs in the most acute man-
151. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324, 330.
152. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 243 (1941).
153. Treaties and Executive Agreements. Hearings on SJ Res. I and SJ Res 43 Before
the Subcomm ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1953).
154. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
155. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or PresidentialAgreements:
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 317 (1945).
156. United States v. Capps, 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953).
157. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
158. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
159. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324.
160. See cases cited supra notes 142 and 144.
161. Mathews, supra note 5, at 378.
162. Id. at 374.
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ner. The President establishes all foreign policy and is privy to for-
eign relations information to which no other government branch is
entitled.'63 Members of Congress, on the other hand, are elected on
the basis of local issues and possess a greater degree of information
and competence in domestic matters than in foreign affairs.
164
To this point, it has first been determined that executive agree-
ments are legally valid. Second, the President has discretionary au-
thority to select the type of international agreement, provided it is
within his constitutional powers. Third, executive agreements are a
necessary tool of foreign policy, providing expediency, accuracy,
trustworthiness and secrecy.
What now remains to be determined are the international im-
plications arising from the foregoing domestic law considerations.
It is vitally important to the welfare of the United States to under-
stand the Federal Government's capabilities and limitations in con-
ducting foreign affairs. Equally important, however, is a
realization of the international repercussions of such determina-
tions and their viability under international law.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF AGREEMENT E UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under international law a treaty made in violation of a na-
tion's constitution is binding unless it is of "fundamental impor-
tance" and the other party had reason to know or knew of the
violations. '65 There are two central issues in the international law
analysis. First, as previously discussed, is whether Agreement E is
unconstitutional since it was not formulated as a treaty and is there-
fore a "fundamental violation." Second, is whether Israel knew or
should have had knowledge of any fundamental violation.
The United States, arguably, has a dichotomy of interest in the
application of international law. One interest might support the va-
lidity of Agreement E under international law for reasons of: (1)
good faith of the United States in foreign affairs; (2) maintenance
of good moral and diplomatic standing in the Middle East; and, (3)
having an executive agreement deemed unconstitutional makes the
Senate Legislative Counsel's position that much stronger. On the
other hand, if Israel does find need to request assistance under
Agreement E, the United States might not want to be legally bound
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. L. HENKIN, supra note 86, at 137.
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because of: (1) the financial cost; (2) change in United States-Israeli
relations; (3) an aggressive act by Israel; or, (4) change in United
States national policy.
A. Agreement E is Unconstitutional
Entering into an agreement beyond the President's constitu-
tional authority, without the advice and consent of the Senate, con-
stitutes a "fundamental violation" of the United States
Constitution. 66 If the Senate Legislative Counsel's position is
valid, then Agreement E's present existence as an executive agree-
ment is a fundamental violation of the Constitution.
As to Israel's knowledge of a fundamental violation, several
factors support the contention that Israel should have known that
Agreement E is unconstitutional. Executive agreements have been
a matter of controversy since the enactment of the Constitution.
67
This controversy, arguably, constituted a warning light to Israel
that Agreement E might be defective. The United States Constitu-
tion makes no mention of the executive agreement.168 It would not
be unreasonable, therefore, to hold that Israel should be aware of
the provisions of the United States Constitution, which only pro-
vides for the making of a treaty.
169
The historical conduct of the United States in foreign affairs
might also impute knowledge to Israel. The Nixon-Thieu agree-
ments 70 were deemed illegally binding executive agreements which
the United States never fulfilled. An Israeli assertion of ignorance
concerning the events taking place in Vietnam would not be plausi-
ble. Furthermore, Israel should have known that agreements con-
taining language similar to Agreement E's language have been
formulated as treaties. 71 Finally, the legislative branch has been
struggling for some time to regain its treaty-making powers.
Through such acts as the National Commitments Resolution' 72 and
the Clark Resolution, ' 3 Israel should have been aware of the un-
certainties surrounding the President's abilities to make "impor-
tant" national commitments on his own authority. Depending on
166. Sept. 24 Glennon Memo, supra note 4, at 32,711.
167. Feinrider, supra note 3, at 525.
168. U.S. CONST. art. II.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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Israel's rebuttal of each contention, Agreement E could be held in-
valid under international law.
Israel, on the other hand, might refute having knowledge of a
fundamental violation for four reasons. First, executive agree-
ments, customarily, have been implemented in practically all areas
of foreign affairs.' 74 Second, since the treaty-executive agreement
debate is unresolved in the United States, Israel could not be ex-
pected to have known that Agreement E should have been a treaty.
Third, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that execu-
tive agreements are constitutional.' Fourth, the President's pow-
ers are expanded during critical times. The crises in the Middle
East warranted the President to make Agreement E as an executive
agreement. Valid criteria exists on both sides of the knowledge is-
sue, which could or could not implicate Israel with knowledge of a
fundamental violation.
B. Execulive Agreements are Constitutional
Agreement E is constitutional in its present form if the Presi-
dent has the constitutional authority to make executive agreements.
Obviously, if valid domestically, there is no issue under interna-
tional law as to Agreement E's legality. The question still remains,
however, as to what degree Israel can rely on Agreement E's assur-
ances. In reality, this issue will remain unresolved until either the
United States or Israel seek to implement one of the provisions.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The creation of Agreement E as an executive agreement has
caused much constitutional debate and epitomizes the power strug-
gle between the executive and legislative branches to conduct for-
eign affairs. The executive branch asserts that Agreement E is
legally binding, having been created under the President's constitu-
tional powers. The legislative branch claims that due to Agreement
E's military and economic assurances, it is an agreement of "excep-
tional national importance" and therefore is invalid without Senate
advice and consent. This debate, concerning the proper application
of treaties and executive agreements, has been in existence since the
enactment of the Constitution.
The Constitution expressly provides for the making of treaties,
174. See supra notes 139-61 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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but makes no mention of the President's authority for formulating
executive agreements. Custom and usage, and the Supreme Court
of the United States, however, quell any absolute determination
that Agreement E is unconstitutional. Executive agreements have
customarily been applied to many areas of foreign affairs. The
Supreme Court has also recognized the utilization of executive
agreements as constitutionally permissible. Expediency, trustwor-
thiness, secrecy and accuracy make executive agreements a vital
tool in conducting foreign affairs. Treaties, however, are subject to
the deliberations of the Senate, safeguarding any Presidential usur-
pation of power. It is noted that in moments of crisis, the Presi-
dent's scope of authority is expanded into areas where normally his
actions would be unconstitutional.
The parameters defining what subject matter should be appro-
priated to either treaties or executive agreements are nebulous. The
constitutional uncertainties surrounding Agreement E leave much
opportunity for debate over the binding-nonbinding status of the
Agreement under international law. Many factors support a find-
ing that Israel should have known that Agreement E might be a
fundamental violation of the United States Constitution. In reality,
however, one cannot expect Israel to have known of such a viola-
tion, since the treaty versus executive agreement debate is still un-
resolved. The questionable assurances of Agreement E would have
stirred little or no debate if the Agreement had been made as a
treaty, and therefore received the advice and consent of the Senate.
Due to the potential dangers in the Middle East, however, expedi-
ency may have warranted the use of an executive agreement.
One of the major considerations enveloping Agreement E is
the moral and diplomatic impact of these assurances. Whether
these assurances are given the heightened level of consideration
that the Office of Legislative Counsel accords these assurances, or
whether they are given lesser importance by calling them mere ex-
ecutive policy declarations and promises, the final determination
will be of critical importance.
Paragraphs one, seven, ten, eleven and fourteen are tanta-
mount to Israel's national security and indirectly vital to United
States national security. If the United States intended these assur-
ances to be mere declarations and promises couched in questiona-
ble legal authority, any sincere future Middle East diplomatic
efforts could be weakened severely. Israel is engulfed in a hostile
environment and most assuredly relies heavily on these promises.
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Assurances lacking legal authority raise strong moral and diplo-
matic questions, and compromise unified diplomacy. Agreement
E's legal status is far from being settled absolutely due to the lack of
dispositive authority on executive agreements. The extent of the
United States obligation under Agreement E will remain un-
resolved until either party acts or the constitutional debate is ended.
Greater weight, however, should be given to paragraphs one, seven,
ten, eleven and fourteen before dismissing them as mere executive
declarations and promises.
Bruce Francis De Pol
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